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LOUISIANA'S NEW PARTNERSHIP PROVISIONS: A REVIEW OF THE
CHANGES AND SOME CONTINUING PROBLEM AREAS
Introduction
In 1980 the Louisiana Legislature enacted Acts 150, 151i and 152,
which revised and amended Louisiana's partnership law.' The repealed
Civil Code articles had existed since 1825, when the legislature re-
jected Edward Livingston's projet for a Commercial Code and ap-
parently rewrote and placed in the Louisiana Civil Code the portion
on partnership law.2 In the rewriting process, many errors and illogical
classifications crept in and produced an awkward and inconsistent body
of law.' The 1980 revision was an effort to eliminate the confusion
and inconsistencies, and to provide more practical provisions for use
in a society where partnerships are popular vehicles of commerce.
Since their enactment, the provisions of the 1980 partnership revi-
sion have been the subject of four amendments.' Of these, only Act
797 of 1981, substantially amending article 2826 and providing for the
causes of termination of a partnership, will be examined. The other
amendments were primarily technical in nature.'
The 1980 revision brought about several significant theoretical
changes. The first significant change is the elimination of the distinc-
1. Act 150 of 1980 repealed Title XI of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
containing articles 2801 through 2890, relative to partnerships, and revised, amended,
and reenacted a new Title XI, Partnership, including articles 2801 through 2848, providing
the rules governing partnerships and partnerships in commendam. Act 151 of 1980 amended
Code Title XI of Code Book III of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by
repealing Chapter 1, Partnerships, containing sections 3401 through and including sec-
tion 3406, and by providing for the creation of a Central Registry for Contracts of Part-
nership. Act 152 of 1980 amended Code Title XI of Code Book III of Title 9 of the Loui-
siana Revised Statutes of 1950 by enacting a new Chapter 2, Qualification of Foreign Part-
nerships, containing sections 3421 through 3427, providing particular rules governing
foreign partnerships.
2. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. bk. III, tit. XI-Partnership, Reporter's Introduction 1980 at
9 (West Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Introduction]; O'Neal, An Appraisal
of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LA. L. REv. 307, 324 (1949).
3. See authorities cited in note 2, supra.
4. 1981 La. Acts, Nos. 795, 796, 797, & 888.
5. Act 795 of 1981 elaborated on the concept that Act 150 of 1980 was not to be
applied so as to divest already vested rights, stating that such rights include, but are
not limited to, the right to use an existing partnership name. Act 796 of 1981 clarified
section 2 of Act 151 of 1980, wherein it was provided that nothing in Act 151 of 1980 should
affect any limitations on the liability of partners in commendam (limited partners), by
adding that this provision applied to liabilities arising both prior to and subsequent to
January 1, 1981, the effective date of Act 151 of 1980. Act 888 of 1981 amended article
2814 by adding that persons authorized to execute a mortgage on behalf of a partnership
shall, for purposes of executory process, have authority to execute a confession of judg-
ment in the act of mortgage without execution of the articles of partnership by authentic
act.
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tion between ordinary and commercial partnerships. Second, the revi..
sion adopted the theory of mutual agency among the partners and
the partnership with regard to activities in the ordinary course of
business. Third, the revision extended the concept that a partnership
is an entity, a separate, juridical person:' it has a continuity of life
in its own capacity, though one or more of the individual partners
may cease to be partners.
Following a brief analysis of these changes, this note will focus
upon three problem areas in the existing provisions: (1) the creation
of inconsistencies between article 2826 and the remaining provisions
as a result of the amendment of that article by Act 797 of 1981, (2)
the failure of the new provisions to provide a clear statement of the
method for determining an individual partner's liability for -partner-




The 1980 revision made a substantial step toward simplification
of Louisiana's partnership law by eliminating the distinction between
ordinary and commercial partnerships The Civil Code had defined
commercial partnerships as follows:
Commercial partnerships are such as are formed:
1. For the purchase of any personal property and the sale thereof,
either in the same state or changed by manufacture.
2. For buying or selling any personal property whatever, as fac-
tors or brokers.
3. For carrying personal property or passengers for hire, in ships,
vessels or in any other vehicle of transportation.'
Ordinary partnerships were "all such as are not commercial."'" Even
though the Code further subdivided ordinary and commercial
6. The concept of the partnership as an entity was implicit in the articles of the
Civil Code of 1870, and had long been recognized expressly in the jurisprudence, though
not to the extent provided for in the 1980 Revision. See Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann.
319, 322 (1848); Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 365 (1887).
7. A discussion of the new provisions governing limited partnerships, Civil Code
articles 2836-2848, is beyond the scope of this note. The new provisions governing limited
partnership are discussed in Comment, An Examination of Louisiana Limited
Partnership-The Partnership in Commendam, 55 TUL. L. REV. 515 (1981).
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2824 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2825 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2826 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
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partnerships," the definitions provided for these subdivisions served
largely to create only additional uncertainty."2 The jurisprudence
broadly applied the provision defining commercial partnerships; what
began as an ordinary partnership would automatically become a com-
mercial partnership simply by engaging in any of the listed activities
indigenous to commercial partnerships."3 Important legal consequences
flowed from this distinction. For example, commercial partners were
bound in solido for debts of the partnership; ordinary partners were
not.' Commercial partners possessed reciprocal powers of administra-
tion of the partnership assets;" ordinary partners did not.6'6 Addition-
ally, the courts held that commercial partnerships could engage only
in the three activities defined in the Code and therefore could not
own immovable property. Any immovable property acquired in the
name of a commercial partnership was held to be owned by the part-
ners jointly in their capacity as individuals.'7
The Mutual Agency Doctrine
A second significant change brought about in the revision was
the adoption of the doctrine of mutual agency.' 8 Civil Code article 2814,
as originally enacted in 1980, provides:
A partner is a mandatary of the partnership for all matters
in the ordinary course of its business other than the alienation,
lease or encumbrance of its immovables. A provision that a part-
ner is not a mandatary does not affect third persons who in good
faith transact business with the parnter."
With this provision, Louisiana is in conformity with the forty-eight
states"' that have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter
UPA).1'
11. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2826 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150) (dividing
ordinary partnerships into universal and particular), and 2827 (as it appeared prior to 1980
La. Acts, No. 150) (dividing commercial partnerships into general and special).
12. O'Neal, supra note 2, at 472-77.
13. Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386,387,104 So. 124,125 (1925).
14. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2872 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
15. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2870(1) (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
16. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2870(5) & 2874 (as they appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
17. Brinson v. Monroe Auto. & Supply Co., 180 La. 1064, 158 So. 558, 562 (1934).
18. For a thorough discussion of the historical development of this concept in the
civil law, see Stein, The Mutual Agency of Partners in the Civil Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 595
(1959).
19. Article 2814 was amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 888. See note 4, supra.
20. Only Georgia and Louisiana have not adopted the UPA. 6 UNIFORM LAws AN-
NOTATED 1 (Supp. 1981).
21. Section 9 of the UPA provides, in part:
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
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The comments to Civil Code article 2814 indicate that this agency
binds the partnership in cases of both actual and apparent authority.'
The doctrine of apparent authority, though not expressly provided
for in the Civil Code, has been expressly articulated in the
jurisprudence of the state and is well embedded in the law of
Louisiana.u Under the former Code provisions ' this mutual agency
was one of the legal consequences flowing only from commercial part-
nerships. Now with only one, broad class of partnership, the extent
of the agency power has been expanded to include the power to engage
in any activity within the ordinary course of the partnership's business,
including the purchase of immovables for cash, but excluding the
alienation, lease or encumbrance of immovables."
Although the Reporter's Introduction to the revision indicates only
one class of partnership, "ordinary," the class might have been
described more accurately as that of "general" partnership (as opposed
to "limited" partnership); the revision did not simply reject one of
the former classes, either ordinary or commercial, in favor of the other.
This distinction should be noted because the revision adopted, for that
general class, characteristics of both of the former classes. For exam-
ple, the doctrine of mutual agency, and the commercial partners'
powers of administration, which were formerly expressed only in com-
mercial partnerships, are now both characteristics of the single class
adopted by the revision.
The Entity Concept
Another significant change effected by the 1980 revision was the
expansion of the concept of the partnership as an entity to include
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partner-
ship of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting
has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the
person with whom he is dealing'has knowledge of the fact that he has no such author-
ity.
(2) An act of the partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business
of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized
by the other partners.
22. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2814, comment (a) states in part:
A partner who has no authority to act for the partnership due to a stipulation in
the partnership agreement can bind the partnership if the third person with whom
he deals neither knows nor has reason to know of the partner's lack of authority
to bind the partnership.
23. Krautkramer Ultrasonics, Inc. v. Port Allen Marine Serv., Inc., 248 So. 2d 336
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). discussed in Harrison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1970-1971 Term-Mandate, 32 LA. L. REV. 231, 232 (1972).
24. See text at notes 14-15, supra.
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2814, comments (a) & (b).
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the consonant concept of continuity of life of the entity. The idea that
the partnership itself is an entity distinct from the individual part-
ners composing it had been recognized in the jurisprudence since 1848,
in Smith v. McMicken:
The partnership once formed and put into action, becomes,
in contemplation of law, a moral being, distinct from the persons
who compose it. It is a civil person which has its peculiar rights
and attributes .... Hence, therefore, the partners are not the
owners of the partnership property. The ideal being, thus recog-
nized by fiction of law, is the owner; it has the right to control
and administer the property to enable it to fulfill its legal duties
and obligations; and the respective parties who associated
themselves for the purpose of participating in the profits which
may accrue, are not owners of the property itself but of the
residuum which may be left from the entire partnership property,
after the obligations of the partnership are discharged.TM
The entity concept is recognized expressly in the new provisions. Civil
Code article 2801 states that "a partnership is a juridicial person,
distinct from its partners . . . ." An alternative approach to the en-
tity theory is the aggregate theory of partnership," in which the part-
ners in their capacity as individuals are considered the real parties
in interest as owners of the partnership property. "A partnership,
at common law, is not a legal entity, but only a contractual status."
' '
Although Louisiana prior to 1980 had adhered to some aspects
of the entity concept, the former Code provision governing causes
for termination did not allow for continuity of life for the partnership
entirely independent of the membership of the partners. Article 2876
(as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150) (hereinafter references
to articles as they appeared before the 1980 revision will be made
as "old," and as they appear after the 1980 revision, "new") provided:
A partnership ends:
1. By the expiration of the time for which such partnership was
entered into.
26. 3 La. Ann. 319, 322 (1848). See, e.g., Brinson v. Monroe Auto. & Supply Co., 180
La. 1064, 158 So. 558 (1934); Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923); Succession
of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887).
27. An analysis of the relative merits of the aggregate and entity theories of part-
nership is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these two theories see gene-
rally Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762 (1915) (criticiz-
ing the UPA's adoption of aggregate concepts), and Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A
Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism 29 HARv- L. REv. 158 (1916) (supporting the UPA's adop-
tion of the aggregate theory over the entity theory).
28. Martin v. Hemphill, 237 S.W. 550, 553 (Tex. App. S B, 1922).
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2. By extinction of the thing, or the consummation of the
negotiation.
3. By the death of one of the partners, or by his interdiction.
4. By his bankruptcy.
5. By the will of all the parties, legally expressed, or by the will
of any of them, founded on a legal cause, and expressed in the
manner directed by law.
New Civil Code article 2826 eliminated the death or interdiction of
any partner as a cause for termination, and also eliminated the
possibility of termination caused by the will of any one of the part-
ners founded on legal cause. New article 2826 of the Civil Code (prior
to Act 797 of 1981) stated:
Unless continued as provided by law, a partnership is ter-
minated by: the unanimous consent of its partners; a judgment
of termination; the granting of an order for relief to the partner-
ship under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code; the reduction of
its membership to one person; the expiration of its term; or the
attainment of, or the impossibility of attainment of the object of
the partnership.
A partnership also terminates in accordance with the provi-
sions of the contract of partnership.'
The italicized clauses, additional causes of termination, were added
by the 1980 revision. Clearly, neither provision creates a cause for
termination based on a change in the membership of the partnership
while the partnership might possibly continue to exist among the re-
maining partners. Additionally, none of the other provisions of Civil
Code article 2826 (prior to 1981 La. Acts, No. 797) allow for the
possibility of terminating the partnership solely due to circumstances
involving a single partner. Under the prior law, the partnership ter-
minated when any partner lost his legal capacity' or when any part-
ner independently decided to withdraw from the partnership."
Highlight 'of Current Problem Areas
Amending the Entity Concept
As discussed previously, the 1980 revision made complete Loui-
siana's employment of the entity theory of partnership by providing
for continuity of the entity's life. Additionally, this concept pervades
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2826 (as it appeared prior to 1981 La. Acts, No. 797) (emphasis
added).
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2876(3) (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
31. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2876(5) (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
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the entire regime. 2 Nevertheless, Act 797 of 1981 amended new Civil
Code article 2826 to eliminate completely the entity's ability to con-
tinue after a change in membership absent unanimous consent of the
remaining partners or an expressly stated contractual right to con-
tinue the partnership." This single change in a regime entirely based
on another concept has produced a number of inconsistencies between
the articles. Moreover, this result is particularly problematical since
it is contrary to the principle that the Civil Code's provisions should
be susceptible to a reading in pari materia." The amended version
of Civil Code article 2826 precludes such a reading by departing
significantly from the scheme of the other thirty-five articles.
Tax practitioners probably provided the impetus for this amend-
ment; they found the continuity of life of the paitnership entity in-
consistent with the interests of their clients who sought classification
as a partnership in order to avoid the tax consequences accompany-
ing classification as a corporate entity. The basis for these conflicting
considerations lies in the Internal Revenue Service's regulations con-
cerning the criteria to be used for distinguishing between corpora-
tions and other forms of associations, such as partnerships and trusts.
The regulations contain six criteria for distinguishing the entities:
1) the existence of associates, 2) an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains therefrom, 3) continuity of life, 4) centralization
of management, 5) limited liability, and 6) free transferability of
interests. 5 The first two criteria, existence of associates and an ob-
32. Reporter's Introduction, supra note 2.
33. 1981 La. Acts, No. 797 added after the last sentence of the first paragraph of
new Civil Code article 2826 the following additional causes of termination:
retirement from the partnership, or the death, interdiction, or dissolution of any
general partner unless the partnership is continued by the remaining general part-
ners under a right to do so stated in the contract of partnership or with the consent
of all the remaining partners.
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 17 states: "Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject mat-
ter, must be construed with a reference to each other; what is clear in one statute may
be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another."
35. 26 C.F.R. S 301.7701-2(a) (1980) states:
(a) Characteristics of corporation. (1) The term "association" refers to an organiza-
tion whose characteristics require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a
corporation rather than as another type of organization such as a partnership or a
trust. There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure cor-
poration which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are:
(i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divided (sic) the gains
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability
for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of
interest. Whether a particular organization is to be classified as an association must
be determined by taking into account the presence or absence of each of these cor-
porate characteristics. The presence or absence of these characteristics will depend
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jective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, are in-
dicative of either the corporate or partnership form of business
organization. The test, then, lies in the remaining four criteria: con-
tinuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests. As long as an alleged partnership meets
no more than two of the four criteria," the tax status cannot be said
to be "more nearly a corporation than a partnership.""7 Some practi-
tioners probably felt that although the regulations would require a
failure to satisfy at least two more of the corporate criteria to lose
partnership status for income tax purposes, a preferable situation
would be to avoid "spotting" the Internal Revenue Service the issue
of continuity of life and risking the possibility of losing on more than
one of the remaining three criteria.
Aside from the questionable practice of amending one provision
for such particularized reasons, the enactment of Act 797 has created
inconsistencies in the partnership law as a body, and serves to defeat
some of the valid improvements sought by the Revision Committee.
One such inconsistency concerns new Civil Code article 2818 and its
comments providing for the causes of cessation of membership. New
article 2818 states:
A partner ceases to be a member of a partnership upon: his
death or interdiction; his being granted an order for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code; his interest in the partner-
ship being seized and not released as provided in Article 2819;
his expulsion from the partnership; or his withdrawal from the
partnership.
A partner also ceases to be a member of a partnership in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the contract of partnership.
Comment (a) under Civil Code article 2818 further states:
This article substantially changes the law. Under prior law
the occurrence of one of the enumerated events of itself may have
terminated the partnership. Under the new law, the partnership
itself does not terminate upon occurrence of the event unless there
results one of the causes for terminating a partnership set forth
in Article 2826 ...
Each of the above enumerated causes, for termination of a partner's
upon the facts in each individual case .... An organization will be treated asan associa-
tion if the corporate characteristics are such that the organization more nearly
resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust.
(emphasis added).
36. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. C.B. 1979-1.
37. 26 C.F.R. S 301.7701-2(a) (1980), quoted at note 35, supra.
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membership naturally will be preceded by a dissolution" of that part-
ner's interest in the partnership. Since the dissolution of any general part-
ner's interest is now also a cause for termination of a partnership," Civil
Code article 2818 is inaccurate and redundant in that it actually restates
the causes for the termination of the partnership found in the amended
version of article 2826, not just of membership."0
The amending of article 2826 also creates an impediment to thefor-
mation of partnerships when read in conjunction with new Civil Code
article 2820. New article 2820 provides, "A partnership may expel a part-
ner for just cause. Unless otherwise provided in the partnership agree-
ment, a majority of the partners must agree on the expulsion." Again,
termination of the partner's interest by expulsion for just cause will re-
quire a dissolution of that partner's interest and cause the termination
of the partnership pursuant to the requirement of article 2826 as amend-
ed by Act 797 of 1981. The Revision Committee had provided for the
convenience of the partners a method for removing one from among them
who was engaging in activities which prejudiced the business, was fail-
ing to perform obligations, or was willfully or repeatedly breaching the
partnership agreement." However, after the amendment the partners
apparently must choose between retaining the partner or terminating
the partnership. Similarly, withdrawal of a partner from a partnership
88. The term "dissolution" did not appear in the Louisiana partnership provisions
until introduced by Act 797 of 1981, which amended Civil Code article 2826, by providing
for termination of the partnership in the event of "dissolution of any general partner."
Although various names are applied to the stages prior to the termination of the partner-
ship, the term "dissolution" is generally understood to be only the act or event precipitating
termination. Following "dissolution" is the process of partitioning the assets, often call-
ed "winding up" or "liquidation," at the conclusion of which the partner's interest is "ter-
minated" or "extinguished." See A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS, & S. SIEGEL, AGENCY-
ASSOCIATIONS - EMPLOYMENT- LICENSING -PARTNERSHIPS 559 (2d ed. 1977); R. HAMILTON.
CORPORATIONS- INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 95.99 (2d ed. 1981).
The process is defined clearly in the Uniform Partnership Act, section 29 which states,
"The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the win-
ding up of the business," and section 30 providing further, "On dissolution the partner-
ship is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the partnership affairs is
completed." In the absence of any other guidance from the Civil Code's provisions, defin-
ing dissolution and the process toward termination in a manner similar to the above should
be acceptable and not inconsistent with any other codal provisions.
39. See note 33, supra, and accompanying text.
40. But see LA. Clv. CODE art. 2801, comment (e), which states in part, "As a juridical
person, a partnership is a legal entity distinct from the partners who compose it." Act
797 of 1981 clearly makes this statement inaccurate, inasmuch as the continued existence
of the entity is entirely dependent on the composition of its members remaining unchanged.
41. LA. CIr. CODE art. 2820, comment (a).
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constituted for a term'" or from a partnership without a term' will result
in the termination of the partnership. An awareness of these problems
by potential partners may deter them from deciding to operate in the
partnership form.
Prior to Act 797, new Civil Code article 2823 read in conjunction with
article 2824 implied that a partner who chose to terminate his member-
ship, who was expelled for just cause, or who ceased to be a member
because his interest had been seized and held under a writ of execution
and his interest was not released within thirty days" acquired the status
of a creditor. This former partner was entitled to be paid an amount equal
to the value of his interest, 5 "as soon as that amount is determined.""
Rather than ranking second as an unsecured creditor in new Civil Code
article 2833's hierarchy of partnership creditors, the partner whose
membership has terminated ranks equally with other former members
of the now also terminated partnership; all are entitled first to their con-
tributions and then to a division of the surplus. 7
New Civil Code article 2827 provides, "a partnership may be express..
ly or tacitly continued when its term expires or its object is attained,
or when a resolutory condition of the contract of partnership is fulfill-
ed." In light of the last clause of the amendment added by Act 797 of
1981, "unless the partnership is continued by the remaining general part..
ners under a right to do so stated in the contract of partnership or with
the consent of all the remaining partners," new Civil Code article 2827's
provision for continuation by tacit agreement apparently conflicts with
article 2826 as amended. Since Act 797 of 1981 is the most recent ex.
pression of legislative will, this provision for continuation by tacit agree-
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2821 provides:"If a partnership has been constituted for a term,
a partner may withdraw without the consent of his partners prior to the expiration of
the term provided he has just cause arising out of the failure of another partner to per-
form an obligation."
43. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2822 provides: "If a partnership has been constituted without
a term, a partner may withdraw from the partnership without the consent of his part-
ners at any time, provided he gives reasonable notice in good faith at a time that is not
unfavorable to the partnership."
44. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2819.
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2823.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2824.
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2833:
The creditors of a partnership shall be paid in the following order of priority: secured
creditors in accordance with their security rights; unsecured creditors who are not
partners; unsecured creditors who are partners.
If any assets remain after the payment of all secured and unsecured creditors,
the capital contributions shall be restored to the partners, Finally, any surplus shall
be divided among the partners proportionally based on their respective interests
in the partnership.
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ment arguably must be considered implicitly repealed.' 8 Clearly, new
Civil Code article 2829 ("A change in the number or identity of partners
does not terminate a partnership unless the number is reduced to one.")
is totally inconsistent with the amended version of article 2826, and
likewise arguably must be considered repealed by the more recent ex-
pression of legislative will.' 9
Finally, since the entity will terminate upon the occurrence of any
of the conditions listed in new Civil Code article 2826, (as amended by
1981 La. Acts, No. 797), formally transferring title of the property from
the old partnership entity to the new becomes necessary. Absent such
a formal transfer, a cloud will remain upon the title since continuation
of the title in the name of the former partners indicates that the former
partners still have a residual interest in the property. Clearing this cloud
may require a quitclaim deed from the estate of a former partner. The
new provisions had made acquisition of immovable property by the part-
nership entity less difficult;10 the amended form of article 2826 negates
that result.
Now the partnership seeking to survive changes in membership must
provide contractually that such a right exists, or in the absence of such
a contractual right the remaining members must consent unanimously
to continuing the life of the entity. 1 The consequences are substantial,
and the singular purpose behind the amendment to article 28262 arguably
does not justify such a complete turnaround in the concept of contin-
uity: from one of ease of transition to one of devastating consequences
for failure to make express provisions at the outset. Further, the
awkwardness and inconsistency now existing between articles origin-
ally intended to be read in conjunction with one another should amply
justify a reconsideration of Act 797 of 1981 and pave the way for
reinstatement of the policy chosen by the Revision Committee, that the
48. LA. Crv. CODE art. 22 provides: "Laws may be repealed either entirely or partially.
by other laws."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 23 states: "The repeal is either express or implied: .... It is implied
when the new law contains provisions contrary to, or irreconcilable with those of the former
law."
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2829. comment, which provides in part that "this rule is consis-
tent with the concept that a partnership is an entity distinct from its partners," is another
example of the pervasiveness of the entity concept in the regime formulated by the Revi-
sion Committee, which regime has been set awry with the passage of Act 797 of 1981.
50. See text at notes 108-09, infra, discussing the hazards faced by partnerships ac-
quiring immovable property and burdens imposed on those seeking to* buy immovables
purportedly owned by the partnership.
51. See 1981 La. Acts, No. 797 (amending Civil Code article 2826). See also note 33,
supra.
52. See text at notes 35-37, supra.
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partnership entity has a life of its own independent of the individual
members composing it.
Virile Share and Computing Partner Liability For Partnership Debts
As discussed previously,' the distinction between ordinary and com-
mercial partnerships no longer exists. Under the former Code provisions,
commercial partners were bound in solidow (the creditor had the right
to compel any one of several debtors obliged to the same thing to pay
the whole debt, exonerating the-others toward the creditor5"). On the
other hand, ordinary partners each were bound for their share of the
partnership debt, calculating such share "in proportion to the number
of partners, without any attention to the proportion of stock or profits
each is entitled to.""
In addition, ordinary partners lacked powers of agency with respect
to the partnership.? Old Civil Code article 2822 clearly provided that
in the event an ordinary partner made unauthorized purchases for the
joint account, the other partners could elect whether they would take
such a purchase on the joint account. Similarly, old article 2870(5) pro-
vided that in other than commercial partnerships (i.e., ordinary), a part-
ner could not, solely as a result of his status as partner, alienate or engage
the things which belong to the partnership. To do so required an agree-
ment granting the partner the administration of the assets. In conjunc-
tion with this restricted power of agency, the burden of the risk of loss
was borne by the creditor. An examination of old Civil Code article 2874,
indicates that for a creditor to bind ordinary partnerships for the
unauthorized debt incurred by one of the ordinary partners, the creditor
must prove that the partnership was benefited by the transaction.' Thus,
under the earlier law, with the limited exception of the rules applicable
to the narrowly defined commercial partnership, the prior partnership
provisions restricted the ability of partners to incur debts on behalf of
the partnership and limited the partners' liability for partnership debts
incurred."
Under the 1980 revision, the partners possess virtually the same
53. See text at notes 8-17, supra.
54. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2872 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
55. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2091.
56. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2873 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
57. See note 16, supra.
58. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2874 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150):
If a debt be contracted by one of the partners of an ordinary partnership, who
is not authorized, either in his own name or that of the partnership, the other part-
ners will be bound, each for his share, provided it be proved that the partnership
was benefited by the transaction.
59. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2872 & 2873 (as they appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
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powers of agency possessed by commercial partners under the old
regime." Absent any express agreement to the contrary,6 partners
nevertheless apparently have been granted the same limited liability
possessed by ordinary partners under the former regime. 2 However,
this construction is somewhat uncertain because the term "virile share"
is never defined although it is used in article 28173 and in the comments
to three other Code articles."
The word virile comes from the Latin adjective virilis, and in the
juridical context means that "which falls to a person" or one's "share
or part."6 The problem lies in computing this share or portion. In the
absence of any clear mandate from the legislation, two possible ap-
proaches exist for interpreting and computing a partner's "virile share."
One possibility is the continuation of old Civil Code article 2873's rule
of calculating liability in proportion to the number of partners. Support
for this alternative approach may be found by tracing the use of the word
virile to its origin, article 44 of the Digest of 1808.0 In this source provi-
sion, the amountconstituting "virile share," although not clearly defin-
ed, is implicit in the clause, "bound ... for his virile share, although his
share in the partnership was less."" Additional support for this alter-
native may be found by looking to the origin of article 44 of the Digest
of 1808, article 1863 of the Code Napoleon" which describes liability as
"[E]ach one for an equal sum and share .... ."
9
60. See text at notes 18-25, supra.
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2817, comment (c).
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2817: "A partnership as principal obligor is primarily liable for
its debts. A partner is bound for his virile share of the debts of the partnership but may
plead discussion of the assets of the partnership."
63. See note 61. supra.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2815, comment: "[A] partner is liable toward third persons for
his virile share of the debts of the partnership." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2817, comment (c): "IFlor
all partnerships, each partner is liable only for his virile share." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2828,
comment (b): "IWlithdrawing partners have virile share liability for debts incurred prior
to withdrawal ......
65. FREUND'S LATIN DICTIONARY 1996 (E. Andrews ed. 1879) (C. Lewis & C. Short rev.
1907).
66. LA. DIGEST of 1808, bk. III, tit. IX, ch. III, sec. II, art. 44:
In those partnerships every one of the partners is bound towards the creditors
for his virile share, although his share in the partnership was less, if the parties who
contracted the debt did not explain themselves on the subject.
67. See note 66, supra, and accompanying text.
68. Code Napoleon art. 1863 (1804):
Partners are liable to creditors with whom they have dealt, each one for an equal
sum and share, even if the share of one of them in the partnership is smaller, unless
the -contract has specifically restricted the responsibility of one of the partners in
proportion to his share.




Upon the recommendation of the redactors," article 44 of the Digest
of 1808 was suppressed in 1825 in favor of the wording which appeared
in article 2873 (1870) (then numbered article 2844 (1825))."' The word virile
did not reappear until the 1980 revision. Support for retaining the earlier
notion of "equal shares" is found in the Reporter's Introduction to the
1980 revision, which refers to the revision providing for "joint liability."
In Louisiana Civil Code article 2086 the proportion due by joint obligors
is calculated as, "by the number of obligors, each for an equal part." Last-
ly, comment (c) to Civil Code article 2817 states that "a partner of an
ordinary partnership had virile share liability." However, for reasons
to be discussed below, perhaps this statement should not have been made
without including in the comment some elaboration as to the precise
character of that liability."2
A second, preferable alternative exists for computing partners'
liability for partnership debts. Although the term "virile share" has ap-
peared only sporadically over the years in Louisiana's partnership pro-
visions, the term is not completely foreign to the Louisiana Civil Code.
The first paragraph of Civil Code article 2103, concerning liability as be-
tween themselves of debtors in solido states, "When two or more deb-
tors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises from a contract,
a quasi-contract, an offense or a quasi-offense, the debt shall be divided
between them. If the debt arises from a contract or a quasi-contract, each
debtor is liable for his virile portion."'73 While commentary on partner-
ship law by French legal writers is scarce," an abundance of doctrine
discusses the nature of "virile share" liability for solidary obligors pur-
suant to Code Napoleon article 1213, the source provision of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2103."5 Though Louisiana partners under the new
regime are not solidarily liable, the method of computing a "virile share"
as suggested by these authorities should nevertheless be applicable to
Louisiana partners' "virile share."
70. 1 A REPUBLICATION OF THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825 340
(1937).
71. Id.
72. See text at notes 79-80, infra.
73. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2103 (emphasis supplied).
74. This scarcity results largely from the fact that the special rules of partnership
law were provided by the commercial law, and most civil partnerships engaging in any
significant business activity adopted the commercial form and were subject to commer-
cial laws and usages. 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 1933, at 159 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
75. Code Napoleon art. 1213 (1804):
An obligation contracted jointly and severally towards a creditor is divided, as
a matter of right, between the debtors who are only liable between themselves for
the share or part of each one.
(H. Cachard trans. 1930).
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The term "virile share (or portion)" creates a presumption that the
debt should be divided into equal shares. However, the presumption that
the portion must be equal is inapplicable in two cases: 1) where the act
indicates expressly a division on another basis, and 2) where it is
demonstrated that the interests of the parties in the affair are unequal.16
In the first instance, both the existence of the partnership contract and
its required recordation" should serve to render the presumption inap-
plicable. Pursuant to the second exception, even if the partnership con-
tract remains unrecorded, a creditor should be allowed to demonstrate
the existence of unequal interests among the partners and to recover
from them their share of the partnership's debts based on such interests.
Aubry and Rau also conclude that the division by virile portions is
presumed to be equal, barring proof to the contrary. 8
Because the presumption of liability for equal shares is rebuttable,
the statement in comment (c) of Civil Code article 2817 that partners
in ordinary partnerships were bound for their virile share was only par-
tially correct. Under the former regime ordinary partners were bound
for their "virile share," to the extent that each partner was at least bound
for his share or portion. But Civil Code article 2873 specifically provid-
ed that such share should be determined equally, as determined by
heads. 9 Therefore, any complete statement of the law as it existed prior
to 1980 must also include noting that the only method of determining
"virile share" was by heads. This concept can be seen more clearly in
article 44 of the Louisiana Digest of 1808,1 which actually included the
term "virile share"; former article 2873 did not. 1 Article 2873 mandated
liability by heads because the term "virile share" was modified by the
following clause, "although his share in the partnership was less .... "
thus rendering the issue of the presumption and its inapplicability moot.
Computing partners' liability for partnership debts based on con-
tractual provisions finds support in other articles of the partnership
76. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 74, at pt. 1, no. 767 at 413.
77. LA. R.S. 9:3406 (1950), as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 151, S 1.
78. 4 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS S 298b (6th ed. Bartin 1965). It has also
been written: "It is natural to suppose that they all have, therein, an equal interest. But
the mode of division must be separated if it is proved ... that convention has assigned
them unequal shares." 2 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET L. BARDE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL,
DES OBLIGATIONSS 1256 at 367 (3d ed. 1907) (translation provided by Mr. Kevin Reese, Center
for Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge, La.).
79. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2873 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150):
In the ordinary partnership, each partner is bound for his share of the partner-
ship debt, calculating such share in proportion to the number of the partners, without
any attention to the proportion of the stock or profits each is entitled to.
80. See note 66, supra.
81. See note 79, supra.
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regime. In particular, Civil Code article 2803 may be viewed as simply
reiterating the presumption of equality, and the exceptions thereto,
discussed by the French authorities. Article 2803 provides, "Each part-
ner participates equally in profits, commercial benefits, and losses of the
partnership, unless the partners have agreed otherwise."' The comment
to article 2803 continues, "[I]f the parties agree, the participation may
be unequal... ."I Although the article refers to losses, rather than liability
for partnership debts, it is axiomatic that any debts the insolvent part-
nership is unable to liquidate are also ultimately losses to be shared by
the partners upon termination of the partnership pursuant to the terms
of the contract.
Furthermore, in the absence of contractual provisions expressly
regarding "losses," Civil Code article 2804 provides additional guidance
toward computing partner liability before resort to the virile share
presumption of equal shares is necessary. That article states:
If a partnership agreement establishes the extent of participa-
tion by partners in only one category of either profits, commercial
benefits, losses, or the distribution of assets other than capital con-
tributions, partners participate to that extent in each category unless
the agreement itself or the nature of the participation indicates the
parties intended otherwise."'
The comment to article 2804 indicates its supplemental nature with
regard to article 2803's provisions, stating, "This article merely creates
a presumption that applies in the absence of a pertinent stipulation.""
Application of article 2804 also might be extended to situations in which
the extent of participation varies among the categories, but the agree..
ment neglects to provide the extent of loss participation, to allow a judge
discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy after considering the various
levels of participation in the other categories.
The remaining articles and comments do not preclude use of the
French interpretation of "virile share." A close examination of Civil Code
article 2815" indicates that it only prohibits a complete exclusion of a
partner from participating in losses, and does not apply to agreements
whereby partners share losses based on their proportionate interest in
the entity. Article 2815's comments simply reiterate that a creditor may
not to be denied the right to obtain from each partner that partner's virie
share, a statement that does not in any way preclude determining those
82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2803.
83. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2803, comment (a).
84. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2804.
85. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2804, comment (b).
86. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2815 states: "A provision that a partner shall not participate in
losses does not affect third persons."
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shares as proposed here. The comments to articles 2817 and 28287 do
not modify or define their use of the term virile share and therefore do
not create any inconsistencies with the suggested interpretation of the
term.
This second alternative is advantageous primarily because the ex-
tent to which each partner shares in the debts of the partnership will
reflect each partner's interest in the partnership. The method of com-
puting liability by heads requires of creditors a heightened knowledge
of Louisiana partnership law as opposed to the knowledge required under
the French interpretation. For example, a partnership may be compos-
ed of six individuals, one partner's interest in all profits, losses, and com-
mercial benefits being fifty percent, the remaining five partners each
holding a ten percent interest. When the creditor examines the part-
nership agreement recorded in the public records he quite possibly will
base his credit evaluation upon his knowledge of the partner holding a
fifty percent interest. Under the suggested method of liability computa-
tion pursuant to the French doctrine, he rightfully would anticipate col-
lecting at least half of any unliquidated debt from the fifty percent part-
ner in the event of the partnership's insolvency. However, under the
computation-by-heads method, each partner is liable for only one-sixth
of any unliquidated partnership debts. If the facts in the example go one
step further and each of the ten percent partners is also insolvent, then
the creditor will only recover one-sixth of the total debt under the
computation-by-heads method. It is far more realistic, and equitable, to
expect the partner who stands to profit the most and whose investment
is the largest to bear the greatest burden in the event of failure. Under
the computation-by-heads method, the creditor could avoid the contract
of partnership through the revocatory action only if the dominant part-
ner had surrounded himself intentionally in the partnership with part-
ners known to be poor credit risks in an attempt to defraud creditors
in the event of business failure."
The legislature could act to provide even greater protection to the
creditor in a manner consistent with Louisiana's civilian heritage. In the
example above, if the term "virile share" is interpreted as referring to
the actual partnership interest and not by heads, the creditor may only
collect ten percent from each of the lesser partners in the event the fifty
percent partner is insolvent. Some French authorities argued that Code
Napoleon article 1863" was for the benefit of the creditor, allowing him
to sue either on the contract or for equal shares from each partner, depen-
87. See note 64, supra.
88. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1978-1994. Accord, O'Neal, supra note 2, at 485.
89. See note 68, supra.
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ding on which situation was most advantageous.' This principle was
argued by Pothier even before the Code Napoleon with respect to non-
trade partnerships, the predecessor of Louisiana's former ordinary
partnerships. 1 Thus, in the situation postulated above, the creditor could
proceed to obtain five-sixths of the debt from the five, ten percent part-
ners in the event of the remaining, fifty percent partner's insolvency.
However, under either method of computing "virile share" liability,
the creditor will still be unable to obtain complete payment of the debt
if any individual partner is insolvent. The adoption of this scheme of
liability seems inconsistent with the policy pervading the revision itself,
the prior law, and the practice of other jurisdictions under the Uniform
Partnership Act: to protect creditors dealing with partners and part-
nerships, by placing the burden for the risk of loss resulting from a part-
ner's inability to share in partnership debts on the partners as between
themselves, and not on the creditor.
The problem with the provisions of new Civil Code article 2817 is
not that sophisticated lenders, such as banks and savings and loan insti-
tutions, will bear the risk of loss. These creditors simply will require
an express agreement to the effect that the partners will be solidarily
bound for the debt." Instead, because the risk of loss resulting from a
partner's inability to pay his share of the partnership debts is shifted
onto unwitting, innocent third parties, these less sophisticated creditors
will bear the loss. Certainly capable of being included in this class of
losing creditors would be casual suppliers, employees, and judgment
creditors whose rights arose from delictual acts of the partnership." Ob-
viously, these parties are either unable or unlikely to require all the part-
ners to agree expressly to solidary liability for debts of the partnership
arising out of these non-business and business relationships.
Illustrative of the new partnership provisions' protection of creditors
90. G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET A. WAHL, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL SOCIETE S 339, at
212 (3d ed. 1907) (translation provided by Mr. Kevin Reese, Center for Civil Law Studies,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La.).
91. R. POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP 5 104, at 79 (O.D. Tudor
trans. 1854).
92. LA. ClV. CODE art. 2817, comment (c).
93. The Reporter's Introduction implies incorrectly that individual partners, through
the partnership, would be joint tortfeasors, and that the general rule of solidary liability
among joint tortfeasors is not precluded by the provisions on virile share liability. Con-
ceivably, a partnership could be liable in solido with an individual partner for the delictual
act of the partner. However, the other individual partners are separate juridical entities
from the partnership and the tortfeasor partner. The other partners cannot be said to
be in pari delicto simply by virtue of an interest in the partnership, and hence, cannot
be bound solidarily for torts committed by another partner. It is only in the event that
the partnership is unable to satisfy the debt that the remaining partners will be called
on to satisfy the obligation, and then only for their virile share under article 2817.
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is Civil Code article 2817 which gives the partner the right to plead
discussion of the partnership assets ' and places the burden of pointing
out the partnership's property on the partner." However, this remedy
is inadequate since, if the issue at hand is the extent of a partner's liability
for partnership debts, the partnership's assets are not sufficient to meet
its debts (i.e., it is insolvent). Simply pointing out what assets do exist
will not prevent the creditor from ultimately incurring a loss, but will
serve only to mitigate it.
Another situation where the prohibition of shifting the risk of loss
is exemplified is new article 2815's denial of giving effect to loss stipula-
tions between the parties. Agreements on the liability for the partner-
ship's debts are effective between the parties, but cannot serve to deny
a creditor's right to obtain from each partner his virile share of the part-
nership's debts.' Strictly by analogy, similar protection is provided
creditors relying on manifestations of the partnership under the limited
partnership provisions of the 1980 revision, wherein use of a partner's
name in the name of the partnership in commendam creates liability as
to third persons as if the partner were a general partner.
In light of the expanded ability of each partner to incur debts for
the partnership,98 some countervailing protection should be allowed
creditors. Partners surely will not stipulate voluntarily solidary liabil-
ity in the contract of partnership, and many casual suppliers will not
endeavor to require an agreement to that effect. Arguably, the law itself
should provide the basis for heightened creditor protection.
Perhaps adoption of a provision similar to UPA section 40(d) would
be an appropriate solution. Section 40(d) provides that liability sharing
shall be in proportion to the partner's relative share of profits." In the
event one partner is insolvent, the risk of loss does not then shift to the
creditor, but instead remains with the partners, who each contribute to
the satisfaction of the creditor's demand in proportion to their share of
profits."' For example, consider the situation when three partners with
94. See note 62, supra.
95. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2817, comment (a).
96. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2815, comment.
97. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2838.
98. See text at notes 18-25, supra, for a discussion of the expanded powers of agency.
99. Uniform Partnership Act Section 18 provides that the rights and duties of the
partners are subject to any agreements between the partners, but the fact that the part-
ners may choose to share losses in proportions other than in the proportion in which they
share profits does not in any way impair creditors' rights to collect from the other part-
ners in the event one partner is insolvent and unable to contribute his share in satisfac-
tion of the creditors' demands.
100. See generally Glassell v. Prentiss, 175 Cal. App. 2d 599, 604, 346 P.2d 895, 901
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1959); Roberts v. Roberts, 118 Colo. 524, 526, 198 P.2d 453, 455 (1948);
Greiss v. Platzer, 131 N.J. Equity Rep. 160, 161, 24 A.2d 408, 409 (1942).
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interests of 40 percent, 40 percent, and 20 percent, respectively, are
members in a partnership whose assets are insufficient to satisfy the
partnership's debts. Additionally, one of the partners owning a 40 per-
cent interest is individually insolvent. Under the UPA, of the unsatisfied
claims of the partnership's creditors, one of the remaining solvent part-
ners will pay 40 percent of the debts, the other 20 percent. Of the other
share, unsatisfied due to the partner's insolvency, the remaining two
partners pay this unsatisfied portion in the ratio of 40:20 or 2:1.
Continuing Difficulties With Partnership Ownership of Immovables
Aside from the problems discussed previously concerning ownership
of immovables and the lack of continuity of the entity under existing
provisions,"0 ' certain other unavoidable problems relating to transfer of
title were created by the 1981 legislation. The prior law required a writ-
ten partnership agreement for an immovable to be owned by the part-
nership."2 Additionally, the agreement had to be recorded in the parish
where the business's principal establishment(s) were located.' Con-
ceivably, property could be owned in the partnership name in a parish
where the partnership did not maintain a "principal establishment" and
no agreement would be recorded in the parish of the property's situs.
Failure to record the partnership agreement, even though the title was
recorded in the name of the partnership, resulted in the partnership's
immovables being owned by the partners in indivision rather than by
the partnership entity.'
Even more unfavorable to efforts of partners to own immovable prop-
erty through the partnership entity were consequences flowing from the
commercial/ordinary partnership distinction. The courts narrowly con-
strued the definition of a commercial partnership under the prior law,
and held that commercial partnerships were incapable of owning immov-
able property.' 0 Additionally, engaging in any activity defined as being
commercial transformed the partnership from ordinary to commercial.'
Lastly, proof of the existence of a partnership as a commercial one could
be made by use of parol evidence.' As a result, the only way to deter-
101. Discussed in text following note 50, supra.
102. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2836 (as it appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
103. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2846 & 2847 (as they appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
104. See Gulf Union Mortgage Corp. v. Michael & Barber Constr. Co., 251 So. 2d 459
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Michael, 244 So. 2d 882 (La. App.
1st. Cir.), unit refused, 258 La. 368.246 So. 2d 685 (1971); Madison Lumber Co. v. Picheloup,
12 La. App. 196, 125 So. 175 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
105. See Skillman v. Purnell, 3 La. 494 (1832); Hollier v. Fontenot. 216 So. 2d 842 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1968).
106. Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386,387,104 So. 124,125(1925).
107. Brown v. Bank of Minden, 167 La. 421, 422, 119 So. 413, 414 (1928).
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mine who owned immovable property in a parish in which title was
recorded in the name of a partnership was first to find the recorded part-
nership agreement in the parish of the business's principal establishment
(not necessarily the same parish) and then go to the situs of the business
and observe whether the entity was a commercial or ordinary partner-
ship. As a consequence of these laborious requirements, other devices
were utilized by associated persons seeking to own immovable proper-
ty for the use of their business, such as forming corporations to hold
the immovables, or buying the immovable in a partner's individual capaci-
ty and leasing it to the partnership entity.
The new law was proposed,*in part, to facilitate partnership owner-
ship of property, and to avoid the pitfalls of Gulf Union Mortgage v.
Michael,"8 which held that a failure to record the partnership agreement
resulted in the immovable being owned by the partners individually, even
though title was recorded in the name of the partnership. The new pro-
visions also sought to avoid the dilemma noted above whereby immovable
property of an ordinary partnership became vested in individual com-
mercial partners. However, disparities remain under the new provisions
as well. For instance, if the partnership agreement is written at the time
the property is purchased, title might be recorded in the name of the
partnership, yet be owned by the partners individually until the date
the agreement is recorded, when ownership then vests in the
partnership." This "floating title" possibility merely adds additional
uncertainty to the status of the immovable's ownership, but this prob-
lem can be cured by the subsequent recordation of the agreement. 110 A
vice of an incurable nature results, however, when the agreement itself
is not written until after the partnership acquires the immovable and
records title in its name. This property will continue to be owned jointly
by the partners as individuals.' A separate act is required to transfer
title to the partnership. Thus, the provisions of the 1980 revision make
necessary in every title search an accurate determination of the date
of the written partnership agreement and the date the immovable was
acquired. This change will require additional expenditures of time,
militating against ease of transferability of any property which includes
the name of any partnership in its title record. This additional require-
ment ultimately will cause parties to avoid recording title in a partner-
ship's name and defeat the intended beneficial results of the new
provisions.
Lastly, and unavoidably in the transition from one regime to the
108. 251 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
109. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2806.
110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2806, comment (d).
111. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2806. comment (c).
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other, title searches will now require an examination of both the
secretary of state's records and the clerk of court's records in con-
ceivably every parish to locate the partnership agreement. Once title
has been determined to have been recorded in the name of a partner-
ship, it is necessary to find the recorded agreement under either the
old provisions, which required recordation of the agreement in the parish
of the principal place of business,"' or under the new provisions, which
require recordation of the partnership agreement with the secretary
of state's office.11 Partnerships formed prior to the new regime are not
required to comply with the provisions concerning recordation of the
agreement with the secretary of state, but may do so at their option.""
Additionally, the new provisions do not require the partnership to file
a copy of the partnership agreement in the parish in which the partner-
ship owns immovable property for partnerships formed after January
1, 1981. The sole requirement for post-1981 partnerships is recordation
of the agreement with the Central Registry for Contracts of Partner-
ship, under the auspices of the secretary of state.' Quite likely, a title
searcher will not know the date of the original partnership agreement
for a partnership found in the chain of title. In the case of a partnership
formed prior to January 1, 1981, which was not required to register with
the secretary of state, the title searcher must check the records in both
the parish of the partnership's principal establishment as well as the Cen-
tral Registry. In this case, the title searcher conceivably could be forced
to search the records of all sixty-four parishes to find the original agree-
ment before a complete opinion could be given as to the validity of the
title.
Conclusion
The 1980 revision of Louisiana's partnership law effected several
significant changes in the law. Of immense benefit are the elimination
112. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2846 & 2847 (as they appeared prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 150).
113. LA. R.S. 9:3402 (Supp. 1980):
The contract of partnership or a multiple original thereof, duly executed by the part-
ners, or a certified copy thereof, or statements submitted by foreign partnerships
in accordance with R.S. 9:3421, et. seq., shall be filed for registry with the secretary
of state in accordance with the provisions of this chapter to affect third persons as
provided by Civil Code articles 2806 and 2841 (as provided by H.B. No. 695, Reg. Sess.
1980) or when the parties choose to comply with the provisions of this Chapter.
114. Id.
115. Id. S 3406 (1950 & Supp. 1980):
A multiple original of the contract of partnership, or a copy certified by the secretary
of state, and a copy of the certificate of registry, shall be filed for registry with the
recorder of mortgages of the parish in which the partnership maintains its principal
place of business. Failure to file these documents with the recorder of mortgages
as provided by this Section shall not affect the title of immovable property as being
in the partnership or the status of a partner in commendam, or a limited partner.
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of the archaic distinctions between ordinary and commercial partner-
ships, and the expanded powers of agency granted to the partners. These
changes should make the partnership in Louisiana more useful as a vehi-
cle for engaging in commerce in Louisiana. The revision further endea-
vored to give the partnership entity continuity of life, though this
achievement was short-lived as a result of the unfortunate passage of
Act 797 of 1981. This Act has rendered a cohesive, uniform body of law
inconsistent and contradictory and should be repealed or at least
modified.
In the absence of a complete return to the entity concept, the
Legislature should at least eliminate some of the logical inconsistencies
which resulted from Act 797's amending only one article in the midst
of a body of law based on the alternate theory. Some of the more notable
conflicts arise between articles which provide for partnership termina-
tion and membership terminations, the apparent incapacity of the part-
nership to expel a partner, and the inability of a partnership to continue
even by tacit agreement in light of the express statutory requirement
that continuance must be provided for contractually.
Failing either of the two aforementioned courses of action, legal ad-
visers whose clients desire avoidance of the termination provisions of
new Civil Code article 2826 should provide expressly in the contract of
partnership for its continuation; otherwise when an event which preci-
pitates termination occurs, the partnership will cease to exist unless the
remaining partners unanimously agree to continue the entity.
The Louisiana Legislature should adopt at least a clarifying provi-
sion with regard to computing virile share. Absent any such enactment,
the courts should adopt an interpretation of the term "virile share" liabil-
ity which will result in partners' liability being a function of their in-
terest in the partnership, rather than being based upon equal shares com-
puted by heads. Louisiana also should adopt more expansive re-
quirements of partner liability for debts of the partnership. Adoption
of a scheme of partner liability for partnership debts in conformity with
UPA section 40(d) would appear desirable. A provision similar to sec-
tion 40(d) would conform with the public policy underlying the revision,
that in the event of a partner's insolvency the burden of risk of loss is
retained among the partners and not shifted to partnership creditors,
some of whom are incapable of taking any action a priori to protect
themselves.
Lastly, many of the goals of the revision with respect to ease of ac-
quisition of immovables may go unrealized due to the continued, and
unavoidable, existence of impediments present in the title search pro
cess. Some of the impediments to smooth transfer of title are the re-
quisites of determining the date of the written partnership agreement
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and locating the situs of the recorded agreement because of multiple
potential depositories of the agreement.
The 1980 revision of Louisiana law of partnership marks a signifi-
cant improvement in the law. However, the subsequent amendment of
article 2826, the unexplained liability of partners for partnership debts,
and the overlap of provisions in the new and former law with respect
to ownership of immovables will continue to pose problems. Some of these
problems can and should be addressed by the legislature. Remaining
problems in the smooth transfer of title will simply require careful
attention to detail when examining a title which has passed through part-
nership hands.
Mark C. Schroeder
